Existing output series that cover both the antebellum and postbellum periods are inconsistent and unsuitable for comparing cyclical patterns across the nineteenth century. More consistent data show that output in cyclically sensitive sectors was no less, and probably more, volatile before the War Between the States than after it.
trend.10 The antebellum period is restricted to its last two decades because the data relied on below will not allow us to say much about years before 1840. Consistent with James's observation, the Gallman series appears more volatile over 1870 to 1914 than over 1840 to 1859. Dividing the postbellum period at 1890, the period from 1891 to 1914 appears more volatile than 1870 to 1890, but both appear more volatile than 1840 to 1860. What answer do we get from more consistent output series? That depends on one's definition of "output," in a way that has been largely ignored by the literature following Romer.
WHAT DO-WE MEAN BY "OUTPUT"? GNP VERSUS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
In 1950 Simon Kuznets observed that because sectors vary in their sensitivity to business cycles, the cyclical behavior of aggregate output and employment might change over time as a result of shifts in the relative importance of different sectors, even if "there are no marked secular shifts within each sector in responsiveness to business cycles. . . . For example, a decline in the weight of agriculture combined with a lack of responsiveness of agricultural output to business cycles would mean, other conditions being equal, a widening of business cycle 412 Calomiris and Hanes amplitudes.""1 Wesley Mitchell, George Burns, and other National Bureau researchers had shown agriculture to be uniquely acyclical: "the basic industry of growing crops does not expand and contract in unison with mining, manufacturing, trading, transportation, and finance." "In no other great industry for which we have records are the cyclical fluctuations so irregularly related to business cycles as in crop husbandry."'12 Farm output and employment "undergo cyclical movements, but they have little or no relation to business cycles."'13 This had been especially obvious during the Great Depression. From 1930 to 1932 employment fell in every major nonagricultural sector, including trade and services; aggregate employment fell by 14 percent. Meanwhile farm employment increased by 3 percent.'4 But it had also been true in earlier decades. In his study of the period between the War Between the States and World War I, Edwin Frickey found "agricultural production patterns traced out short-term fluctuations bearing little resemblance to those for other major production groups. The causal relationships between the agricultural and non-agricultural groups certainly did not express themselves in the form of any simple correlation. 15 That is not to say that agricultural incomes are acyclical. There may be cyclical patterns in the relative price of farm output. Table 2 ( We intend to construct a consistent antebellum-postbellum index of industrial production along the lines of the postbellum Frickey manufacturing index and twentieth-century Federal Reserve Board production indices. We believe it is impossible to construct an adequately consistent series for real GNP, if only because antebellum data on many important components of farm production are fragmentary or missing altogether.
DATA FOR A CONSISTENT OUTPUT SERIES
Our first job was to collect all data that began by 1840, ran through the postbellum period, were consistent throughout, and indicated the movements of variables that might be correlated with industrial production. That includes quantities of just about any industrial output or input, including transportation services, and imports.21 We excluded data on prices, financial and monetary series, and nominal output values in the absence of reliable and consistent deflators. Many such series show relations to real output, but we want to use the output index to examine those relations and look for changes over time. To indicate cyclical movements the data must be observed at least annually. We found seven annual series on outputs and inputs that meet the requirements and none on a shorter frequency. Most are products of considerable research by others. We are fairly certain that no more can be constructed from primary sources. The series are listed and briefly described in the appendix. Two-pig iron production and cotton consumption-are components of the postbellum Frickey manufacturing index and may be fairly direct indicators of output in two important industries, cotton textiles and iron and steel products, which by themselves made up more than 10 percent of manufacturing employment in the 1840s and 1850s, and slightly less than 10 percent after the war.22 There is no series on the real value of total imports, but we found consistent import volume data for 25 individual goods.23 Some are consumption goods and hence a function of aggregate income; others are inputs and are more directly linked to industrial production. The import series break in 1843, when the fiscal year shifted from ending September to ending June.
It is useful to think of each series as made up of three components: a cyclical component correlated with economywide output movements; an idiosyncratic component reflecting sector-or product-specific shocks to demand or supply; and errors in measurement, presumably independent across the series. For many of the domestic series there is reason to believe that antebellum observations contain larger errors. Import series appear about as reliable in antebellum as in postbellum years but may be subject to relatively large idiosyncratic shocks associated with changes in tariffs. It is hard to account for the effect of these on import levels. There is no index of general tariff rates. The usual proxy, aggregate tariff revenue relative to aggregate import value, varies with the composition of imports as well as changes in protection. Nineteenthcentury tariffs were a bizarre mix of nominal per-unit duties and ad valorem rates, often applied to the same good at the same time. Reclassification of a good from one schedule to another could change effective protection without any change in official rates. Legislative changes in rates or classifications were often peculiar to certain goods; sometimes rates were dropped on some goods and raised on others.24 Imports could be affected by expectations of rate changes that had not yet taken place. Consider wool in the 1890s, described by Taussig:
The [duty-] free admission of wool in 1894 and the re-imposition of duties three years later necessarily caused great shifts. In the year just before the act of 1894, when it was almost certain that wool would become [duty-] free, imports naturally shrank to almost nothing. They then rose abruptly as soon as the abolition of the duty went into effect. Again, after the election of McKinley in the autumn of 18% it became in turn almost certain that the duty would be restored. Consequently during the fiscal year 1896-1897, imports were rushed in from every possible quarter while wool was still free. They then fell abruptly after the passage of the tariff act of 1897.... Not until 1900 were the effects of this abnormal situation out of the way.25 A wool import series would probably give a fairly inaccurate indication of woolen production, much less aggregate production, over the 1890s.
In this paper we restrict our focus to a couple of imports for which changes in tariffs and substitution between domestic and foreign sup- 22 Lebergott, "Labor Force," plies are not a problem: coffee and tea. Both were free of duty from 1830 through the War Between the States and again after 1872.26 These series are described in the appendix. In future work we will examine the other import series.
CHANGES IN VOLATILITY IN THE SET OF CONSISTENT SERIES
An increase in the volatility of industrial production from the antebellum to the postbellum period should show up as an increase in the volatility of each series, unless it is swamped by reductions in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks and measurement errors. The first part of Table 3 trend. Coffee and tea imports, gross or net of re-export, appear less volatile in the postbellum period than over 1840 to 1859 or a longer antebellum period, 1821 to 1859. Thus, the behavior of the series taken one at a time suggests that output volatility decreased from the antebellum to the postbellum period.
Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, the antebellum observations of some of the series may be more affected by measurement errors, though the fact that nearly all, including the import series, show greater antebellum volatility suggests that alone cannot account for the difference between periods. To deal with the problem directly, we can construct an index of movements in the individual series. An index might have different volatility properties from any or all of the component series because they are not independent. There are several ways to construct an index. Here we will construct a couple suitable for the question at hand.
Romer and others have used deviations from trend in the Frickey manufacturing index to indicate postbellum business cycles. Taking that as our standard, we can choose weights for deviations in the individual series so as to best reproduce deviations in the Frickey index. The weights can be taken from a regression of deviations in the Frickey index on deviations in the set of antebellum-postbellum series. Applying the estimated coefficients to the series over both the antebellum and postbellum periods gives the regression's predicted value of deviations from trend in the Frickey series for both periods-a consistent, comparable index of deviations from trend in output. This procedure is reasonable if we can believe that the relation between the set of series and manufacturing production as measured by the Frickey index was stable across the nineteenth century. We do not have enough data to check that, but we can at least make sure that the relation between the antebellum-postbellum series and the Frickey index is stable within the postbellum period. Applying the procedure to deviations from both quadratic and Hodrick-Prescott trends gives two consistent indices.
There are a couple of complications. First, we cannot use the import series in this exercise because they break at 1843. Second, the Frickey index is on a calendar-year basis, but some of the input and output series are not. The observations of a given series may be most closely correlated with the Frickey index at the leading or lagging year. We regressed the Frickey series on each series individually to see which timing was best (again, all expressed as deviation from trend). All gave the closest correlation relative to the same year except anthracite coal production, which was best at the leading year, and lead production and cotton consumption, which were best at the lagged year.
Then we regressed the Frickey index on all of the series (currentyear, lead or lag as appropriate) and applied the estimated coefficients to construct the two antebellum-postbellum indices. Figure 1 
CONCLUSION
The set of consistent antebellum-postbellum series clearly indicates that cyclical movements in industrial production were no larger, and were probably smaller, in the postbellum period than in the last two decades of the antebellum period. The cyclical volatility of GNP could nonetheless have been greater in the postbellum period, only because the share of cyclical sectors in aggregate output had grown relative to the share of acyclical agriculture. Would that constitute an increase in the severity of business cycles?
